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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY J. REHN, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
vs. 
CHARLES C. REHN, 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
i 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 970700-CA 
Priority (15) 
i 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a final decree of divorce within this Court's jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount 
and length of its alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines; 
and for its award of attorneys fees. 
Standard of Review: Trial judges are given "some discretion" in 
deteimining mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah 
1994). Trial Courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony in divorce cases, 
and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated. Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988). In 
reviewing child . . . support proceedings,. . . [we] will not disturb the district court's 
actions unless the court exceeded . . . its . . . discretion. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
1 
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); We review . . . for correctness to the extent it involves 
questions of statutory interpretation. Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep }t of Tramp., 896 P.2d 
632, 633 (Utah 1995); Even though the trial court has considerable latitude to adjust 
financial and property interests, an appellate court will reverse for abuse of discretion. 
Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993); "Whether the trial court's findings 
of fact in support . . . of attorney fees are sufficient is . . . a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996). 
Grounds for Review: The amount of alimony issue is preserved on the 
record at Tr. 112-113 and Ex. J.1 The length of alimony issue is preserved on the record 
at Tr. 10. The child support issue is preserved on the record at Tr. 3, Tr. 94, Tr. 96-97, 
Ex. J.2 The division of debts issue is preserved on the record at Tr. 114.3 The attorneys 
fees issue is preserved at Tr. 8. 
1
 At Tr. 112-114, Charles' attorney argues that Mary is free to seek a full time position 
commensurate with her rate of pay in 1992 of over $13.00/hour and that some of her expenses are 
inflated. Ex. J is a list of Charles' living expenses. 
2
 At Tr. 3, Mary's attorney states the stipulation of the parties: "Visitation would be 
awarded to Defendant in a minimum of the standard and reasonable visitation by Utah Code 
Annotated 30-3-35. The parties have also cooperated well together in sharing the time with the 
children, and when one party is working, the other party caring for the children. I think that 
should continue. They both agree." At Tr. 96-97, Charles testifies that over the eighteen month 
separation the amount of time he has had the children is 45% of the days and nights and Charles' 
attorney states on the record that the parties agree that is the amount. 
3
 At Tr. 114, Charles' attorney argues for equal division of debts. 
2 
Issue 2; The trial court erred in excluding Charles's witness regarding Mary's 
underemployment and income potential. 
Standard of Review: "We will not interfere with a trial court's case 
management unless its actions amount to an abuse of discretion." Sfi£ Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). 
Grounds for Review: The witness exclusion issue is preserved at Tr. 79-89 
andTr. 111.4 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth in full in 
Addendum C attached to the Brief: 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5; Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2(13); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Charles Rehn appeals that portion of the divorce decree awarding 
excessive alimony to Mary Rehn and excessive child support, and ordering Charles to pay 
4
 At Tr. 79-89, the parties argue the issue of witness exclusion, the court rules and 
Charles' attorney proffers the testimony. At Tr. Ill , Charles' attorney moves for a continuance 
of the trial in order to permit vocational experts to testify. 
3 
80% of a $19,000 I.R.S. obligation and $6,884.80 of Mary's attorney's fees. Charles also 
appeals the trial court's exclusion of his witness, Jim White, from testifying at trial. The 
Decree and Findings of Fact, entered September 26, 1997 are attached as Addenda A and 
B, respectively. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
The plaintiffs complaint for divorce and Charles's Counterclaim were tried 
August 14, 1997 before the Hon. Pat B. Brian in Summit County, Utah. The Trial Court 
entered the Findings and Decree on September 26, 1997, granting a divorce, dividing 
debts and awarding child support, alimony and attorney's fees (our pp. 119-130, 
Addendum A and B). 
The formal divorce decree entered September 26, 1997 awarded to Mary 
$1,045.00 of monthly child support; and $1,200.00 per month permanent alimony based 
on her claimed 1996 net income of $1,072.00 from various part time jobs. The Court also 
ordered Charles to pay $6,884.80 of Mary's attorney's fees and 80% of the parties' 
approximate $19,000.00 IRS obligation. 
Defendant, Charles Rehn, filed a timely appeal. 
Statement of the Facts 
Charles and Mary Rehn were married in Story County, Iowa, on August 27, 1977. 
Two boys, ages six (6) and nine (9), are issue of the marriage. (Tr. 12-13.) Both boys 
attend public school in the Park City School District full time. (Tr. 43-44.) The parties 
4 
separated in February 1996. Since the parties' separation, Charles has had and continues 
to have the children forty-five percent (45%) of the days and nights in the year. The 
parties stipulated that they each would have joint legal care, custody and control of the 
children. (Tr. 3). 
At trial the parties stipulated that Charles had the children forty-five percent (45%) 
of the days and nights. (Tr. 96-97) The attorneys read into the record the stipulation of 
the parties that their pattern of sharing the children should continue. (Tr.3). Charles paid 
for all of the family health insurance over and above the court ordered support and also 
provided housing, utilities and food for the boys when they were with him. (Tr. 89-94, 
Ex. J.). 
Following their separation, Charles voluntarily paid total family support to Mary 
in the amount of $ 1,400.00 per month. This amount was agreed upon by the parties and 
was paid in weekly increments. (Tr. 35.) On May 21, 1996, the trial court entered a 
temporary order raising family support to $1,789.93 per month; $750.00 of which was 
designated as temporary alimony. (Tr. 94.) 
Mary earned her M.B.A. degree with an emphasis in marketing in 1985. She also 
has bachelors degrees in food and nutrition and dietetics. (Tr. 19-20, 86.) She has 
worked throughout the parties' marriage in the food service industry. In 1992, Mary 
voluntarily quit her position as the Food Service Director of the Park City School District 
at over $13.00/hr. (Tr. 10-14.) Since 1992, she has worked several part-time jobs. (Tr. 
5 
15, 16.) Presently, she chooses to work part time as a waitress at a Park City restaurant, 
a ticket taker at a Park City ski resort and in the Dan's Foods catering department. Her 
income now is $1,429.00 per month gross which is $6.87 an hour. (Ex. 3 and 5.) In 
seeking employment, Mary has limited her job applications to Park City businesses and to 
positions requiring work only during public school hours. (Tr. 38-40). 
Charles is employed as the managing engineer of Harding Lawson Associates' Salt 
Lake Office. (Tr. 74.) He has the highest position in this company in Salt Lake City. 
(Tr. 77.) Four weeks prior to trial, Charles received an annual pay raise of $2,000.00 
making his gross monthly income $6,833.33 per month. (Tr. 74-75.) 
In a pre-trial telephone conference the day before trial, Charles's counsel 
requested a witness who had been identified to opposing counsel in writing immediately 
after Mr. White was retained two days prior to trial. (Tr. 79-82). He would testify as to 
employment opportunities in the Salt Lake City and Park City areas for Appellee with 
two bachelor degrees and a M.B.A. (Tr. 80.) The judge said trial could be put off two to 
three months and alimony could be raised to assure there would be no financial prejudice 
to Appellee by delaying the trial date. (Tr. 80.) This would allow Appellee to have time 
to find an expert vocational witness. Appellee's counsel later left a telephone message 
with Charles's counsel stating that his client had agreed to the continuance. (P. 80, 85.) 
After Mary's attorney agreed to the continuance, Charles' attorney set a trial date and 
called Mary's attorney to inform him. At that time, Mary's attorney said no, "I am going 
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to trial [tomorrow]." (p. 80.) At trial, there was no motion in limine to exclude the 
witness. There was no otiljection to the witness by Appellee until Mr. White was put 
called to the stand at the end of the trial. (Tr. 79.) The judge then excluded the witness 
and denied Charles's motion to continue the trial for purposes of receiving testimony 
from expert vocational witness based on the lateness of the designation and the inability 
of Mary to consult another expert prior to trial. (Tr. 84.) 
At trial, the court ordered that alimony be increased from $750.00 a month to 
$1,200.00 a month. (Add. B.) The trial court ordered $1045/month child support based 
on the sole support table. (Add. B.) 
Mary estimated her disposable income as $l,072/month, leaving her $3,316 or 
more disposable income after receipt of support. (Ex. 3). Mary estimated Charles 
disposable income was $2,880/month after payment of support. (Ex. 3, Ex. J). Charles' 
unrefuted testimony was that his monthly expenses for himself and two children at home 
forty-five percent (45%) of the time were $3,200 per month before any support, day care 
or debt service was paid. (Ex. J) 
In addition to support, the court ordered Charles to pay $15,200.00 of the I.R.S. 
debt. (Add. B) In addition, the court ordered Charles to pay $6880.00 of Mary's 
attorney fees, over and above his own attorneys fees of approximately the same amount. 
Mary desires to live and work in the Park City area and lives in subsidized housing at a 
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rent of $530.00 per month. (Tr. 26, 38-39) Charles continues to reside in the parties' 
marital condominium at Jeremy Ranch with a rent of $1,000.00 per month. (Ex. J.) 
Two days before trial, Charles retained a vocational expert witness. The same 
day, Charles' attorney sent a letter to Mary's attorney notifying him of the witness. In a 
pre-trial telephone conference the day before trial Charles's counsel requested to put on a 
witness who could testify as to employability of Appellee with two bachelor degrees and 
a M.B.A. in the Salt Lake economy. Appellee's coimsel objected because of insufficient 
notice. The judge said we could put off trial for two-to-three months and raise the 
alimony to $900.00 per month to assure that there would be no financial prejudice to 
Appellee by delaying the trial date. This would allow Mary to have time to find an expert 
vocational witness. Appellee's counsel later left a telephone message with Charles' 
counsel stating that his client agreed to the continuance. After agreeing to the 
continuance, Charles' counsel set a new trial for April 15, 1998. When Charles' attorney 
called Mary's attorney back, he said, "I am going to trial [tomorrow]." At trial, there was 
no motion in limine to exclude Charles' vocational expert. There was no objection to the 
witness by Appellee until he was put on the stand at the end of the trial. The judge then 
excluded the witness based on the lateness of the designation of Charles's witness and 
denied Charles's motion to continue the trial for purpose of receiving testimony from 
expert vocational witnesses. (Tr. 79-89) 
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The court had set no deadlines for the designation of witnesses and ordered no 
exchange of expert witnesses before trial. (Add. D). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although the court awarded $1,200.00 of alimony to Mary, there were no findings 
that Charles on the issues of Charles' expenses and whether Charles is able to pay the 
ordered alimony. Charles makes $6,833/month but after almost $2,000/month in taxes 
and monthly expenses of $3,200 for himself and the children who are with him 45% of 
the time, there is not enough money to cover $2,245/month in support. (Add. E) 
Further the findings of Mary's need were conclusory and did not address the 
factual conflicts between the testimony of Mary Rehn and her estimated expenses in 
Exhibit 2 attached to Addendum 1. The finding of Mary's need of Attorney's fees is also 
cursory and doesn't address the apparent fact that Mary with a substantial support 
payment on top of her income is better able to pay her fees than is Charles. 
The court also finds that Mary was not underemployed. However there are no 
specific findings on the issue although this is a disputed issue: Mary has had significant 
experience in food services management from 1977 - 1992 and she has bachelors degrees 
in dietetics and nutrition and has an M.B. A. in marketing. Instead of working in her field 
where she was earning over $13.00/hour in late 1992, Mary chooses to work various part 
time jobs at an average of $6.87/hour so that she only has to work when the children are 
9 
in school or with their father. (Tr. 36.) Because the court failed to make adequate 
findings as to its orders this case must be reversed and remanded. 
The court erroneously excluded the vocational expert witness of Charles from 
testifying at the trial. Therefore, this case should be remanded for a new trial. 
Charles should have been ordered to pay child support based on the joint custody 
schedule under Udy v. Ucty, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 1995). The parties 
have agreed that they will continue to share the children as they have done. Charles has 
had the children forty five percent (45%) of the time. Yet the court used the sole custody 
worksheet without making findings for its deviation from the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount and length of its 
alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines; for its debt 
allocation; and for its award of attorneys fees. 
A. Amount of Alimony. 
1. Factors in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
Although trial Courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony in 
divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated, Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988), 
failure to consider the Jones factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 
732 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah 1986). The Jones factors are: 
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a. The financial conditions and needs of the [spouse seeking 
support]; 
b. The ability of the [spouse seeking support] to produce a 
sufficient income for [himself or] herself; and 
c. The ability of the [payor spouse] to provide support. 
Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Utah App. 
1996). 
These factors are discussed in detail, as follows: 
a. The Financial Conditions and Needs of Mary. 
The court made the following findings as to Mary's need: "the plaintiff clearly has 
the need for support." (Findings paragraph 37). "$3,300 is not an unreasonable monthly 
expense for a mother and two children." (Findings paragraph 7). "The plaintiffs needs 
are well established at $3317." (Findings paragraph 40, Ex. 2). "Those needs are 
reasonable, and are real." (Findings paragraph 33), 
However, the court made no findings to explain the undisputed evidence that the 
following expenses listed in Exhibit 2 are not actual expenses of Mary: 
Mary estimates a monthly expense of $ 125.00 for counselor and 
attorney's fees, although the court ordered Charles to pay $6850.00 in 
Mary's attorney's fees. The court made no finding as to evidence that 
11 
Mary needed $125/month. in alimony to cover what the court had ordered 
Charles to pay. (Ex.2, Add. B) 
Mary estimated $ 136.00 of child care expense, although it was 
undisputed that Mary is choosing part time work so that she can be at home 
with the children after school and during their school breaks. (Tr. 43) 
Mary estimated she spent $150.00/month. for schooling for herself 
and the children, although it was undisputed that she was not currently 
enrolled in school and the children are in public school. (Tr. 21,43) 
Mary projected her entertainment expense will be $345.00, although 
it is undisputed that when the Rehn's lived together they averaged 
$217/month. on entertainment from February to September, 1995. (Ex. M; 
Add. F) 
The court makes no finding as to how it calculated Mary's taxes at the same rate to 
determine net income of $1078 when it is undisputed that Charles had a much higher 
taxable income and she is awarded both children as tax exemptions and credits. (Ex. 2, 
Add. A) There was no evidence that Mary was not able to meet her expenses with 
support at $l,400.00/month. or $l,789.00/month. before the court raised it to 
$2,245.00/month. There was no finding that Mary's needs changed from when the parties 
agreed at separation that the needs of the Petitioner over and above her income was 
$1,400.00 a month total support although this issue was disputed. (Tr. 35). 
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Without a finding by the court as to which expenses it has used to determine 
Mary's monthly needs in light of the undisputed evidence against the need for several of 
Mary's claimed expenses listed in Ex. 2, it is impossible to determine how the court 
reached its final determination of Mary's need. Without adequate findings of need, the 
court abused its discretion in making an alimony award. 
b. The Ability of Mary to Produce a Sufficient Income for Herself. 
Although the court finds no issue of underemployment, the court has not heard all 
of the evidence because Charles' witness was improperly excluded. In addition, the 
findings made by the court do not show how the court determined that Mary does not 
need to work in her field at the pay level she has achieved historically. 
The court made the following findings as to the earning capacity of Mary: "The 
record is unchallenged that for months on end she has worked weekends and holidays. 
She has scrounged for multiple jobs, some of them perhaps less dignified and less 
rewarding financially and otherwise than she would like to have, but, nevertheless, she 
has bent her back and gone to work. And the court finds there is just simply no issue of 
unemployment or underemployment, based on the historical roles the plaintiff and 
Charles have assumed in this marriage." {Findings paragraph 13). "The ability to earn 
income definitely favors Charles. The ratio is about 80 percent to the defendant, 20 
percent to the plaintiff." {Findings paragraphs 8-9). 
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However, the trial court made no finding to explain the unrebutted evidence that 
when Mary took a full time position in 1992 she earned over $13.00/hr. while her current 
part time jobs pay her an average rate of only $6.87 per hour. 
The court may use historical earnings to evaluate a spouse's earning capacity. In 
1977, the court also decided Westenskow v. Westenskow 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977). In 
that case, the plaintiff/husband was earning a salary of $18,000.00 when he terminated 
his employment and organized his own company. Finding the trial court's award of 
alimony and child support in increasing increments was not inequitable, the court stated: 
It would be reasonable for the court to infer that either 
plaintiffs income from his business would increase or he 
would seek other employment with adequate remuneration, 
reflecting his historical earning ability. Id 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court again addressed the issue of historical 
earnings in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). The husband's income fluctuated 
depending on current business contracts. At the time of the trial, he had no current 
income, but was negotiating a contract. The lower court correctly considered the 
husband's historical earnings: 
We have held that where the husband has experienced a 
temporary decrease in income, his historical earnings must be 
taken into account in determining the amount of alimony to be 
paid. 
Id. At 566. 
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Facts about Mary's underemployment were disputed. Mary voluntarily cut down 
to part time work to care for the small children. (Tr. 14). However, now the children are 
in school full time. She is qualified for the work force with many years of work 
experience in food and nutrition, from at least 1977-1992. As recently as 1992 she was 
earning over $13.00/hour. (Tr. 13). Mary has two bachelor's degrees in the food service 
area and an M.B.A. in marketing. Yet Mary chooses to work in jobs that allow her to be 
with her children when they are not in school and to stay in Park City for work. (Tr.39). 
This undisputed evidence suggests that Mary has education and work experience 
to qualify her for higher paying jobs. Yet there is no finding to explain how the court 
reached its decision that Mary was not underemployed. Because the court made 
inadequate specific findings in support of its determination of the issue of 
underemployment, the court abused its discretion. 
c. The Ability of Charles to Provide Support. 
Charles is making a good salary. However, the court made no findings whatsoever 
as to what his expenses and disposable income are. From the court's findings we do not 
know whether he can afford the amount of court ordered support after he meets his 
expenses for himself and the children when they are with him. 
The court made the following findings on this issue: "The ability to earn income 
definitely favors Charles The ratio is about 80 percent to the defendant, 20 percent to the 
plaintiff." (Findings paragraphs 8-9). The court also found that "the defendant clearly 
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has the ability to pay." {Findings paragraph 37). "Regarding the monthly expenses of 
the parties, the court finds that, in nearly every case that comes before the court, the 
parties are simply going to have to tighten up their belts and make do with less, and that 
is certainly no exception in this particular case." {Findings paragraph 20). 
In Bell v.Bell 810 P.2d at 489 (Utah App. 1991), the court stated: "The trial court 
must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing court 
to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon these 
three factors." Id. 
However, the court made no findings in this case either as to the amount of 
Charles' available income or as to Charles' reasonable expenses. 
It was undisputed that Mary's net income with support will be at least 
$3,316/month. (Plaintiff's Exh. 2). Charles' net monthly income after paying the court 
ordered support will be no more than $2,880 per month, which is at least $436/month. 
less than Mary's net income. (Plaintiff s Exh. 2). 
It was undisputed that Charles' monthly expenses for himself and two children at 
home forty-five percent (45%) of the time were $3,200 per month before any support, 
day care or debt service was paid. (Ex. J, Add. E). His housing expense is 
$500.00/month. more than Mary's as he is not in subsidized housing. He has higher 
transportation costs because he commutes to work from Jeremy Ranch to Salt Lake City 
i 
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while Mary works locally and he has a $200/month higher auto payment on the 1995 
Honda Accord. 
The court abused its discretion by failing to make specific findings as to the ability 
of Charles to pay alimonyj 
2. Permanent Alimony 
Although the court awarded permanent alimony, it made no findings as to the basis 
for this award. (Findings paragraphs 30, 36). 
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that 
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
See Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h). The parties'marriage was twenty years. Twenty 
years should be the longest alimony continues without specific findings to the contrary. 
Because the court did not make the findings required in § 30-3-5(7)(h) of 
extenuating circumstances in support of a permanent alimony award and because there 
were no extenuating circumstances in evidence from which the court could make findings 
supporting a permanent alimony award, this order of the court must be reversed. 
B. Child Support 
The court read the following finding regarding child support. "The child support 
in this case has been stipulated to, pursuant to the guidelines." (Findings paragraph 18). 
The court then ordered child support based on a sole custody schedule. The parties did 
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not stipulate to use the sole custody schedule. The court made no findings on how it 
reached the determination to use the sole custody schedule instead of the joint custody 
schedule. 
U.C.A. §78-45-2(13) provides that there is joint physical custody if "the child 
stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents 
contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support." U.C.A. §§ 
78-45-7.2 requires the court to use the joint custody worksheet when the children are with 
both parents more than twenty five percent (25%) of the nights and pay more than the 
court ordered child support to care for the children unless the court makes specific 
findings supporting deviation from the guidelines. In Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099-
1100 (Utah App. 1995), the court found that "the trial court awarded Mr. Udy visitation 
that exceeded the threshold for joint physical custody under section 78-45-2(10) 
[predecessor statute to U.C.A. §78-45-2(13)]" Id. Therefore, in Udy, the court found an 
abuse of discretion by the court below because the court made no findings as to its 
deviation from the joint custody guidelines. See Id. 
It is undisputed that Charles has had the children for weeks at a time and has 
provided their food, housing, utilities and all of their medical insurance over and above 
the court ordered support. (Tr. 94 Ex. I, J). Both parties stipulated that in the eighteen 
(18) months of separation, Charles had the children an average of forty five percent 
(45%) of the days and nights. Further, the parties agreed on the record to continue their 
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pattern of cooperating in sharing time with the children. (Tr.3). This part of the 
stipulation of the parties on the record did not make it onto the Findings prepared by 
Mary's attorney. 
"If the court does not follow Utah's child support guidelines to order a joint 
custody child support worksheet, it must make findings of fact justifying its deviation." 
Udy at p. 1100. The court made no specific findings justifying its deviation from the 
guidelines here. Because there were no specific findings as to the court's deviation from 
an award of child support under the joint custody guidelines as required by U.C.A. § 78-
45-7.2(3), the court abused its discretion. 
C. Debt Allocation. 
The court found that the distribution of debt should be 80% the responsibility of 
Charles. However, the bases for this determination is not explained in any finding. After 
the court has redrawn the lines of who has what income via its support orders, why the 
court requires debt payment in proportion to incomes prior to support payments cannot be 
determined absent findings. 
Trial judges are given "some discretion" in determining mixed questions of fact 
and law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah 1994). In re Estate of Knickerbocker 
, 912 P.2d 969, 977 (Utah 1996) the court commented: "In a divorce action, the trial court 
must be able to make such orders concerning the . . . debts . . .as will be fair and 
reasonable to all concerned." Id. However, it appears that the trial court awarding a 
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larger portion of the debt to the party who has higher monthly expenses and less 
disposable 
To permit appellate review of a property and debt distribution, the distribution 
must be based upon adequate factual findings and must be in accordance with the 
standards set by this states's appellate courts. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 
(Utah App. 1994). Failure to make findings on all material facts is reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a finding 
in favor of the judgment. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1990). 
Not only does Mary have at least $3,316 disposable income compared to Charles 
$2,880 or less of disposable income, but also Charles has been required to pay $6,880 of 
Mary's attorney's fee as well. (Ex. 3, Add. B). While at the same time, Charles has not 
only a $500/month. higher rent than Mary and a $200/month. higher car payment than she 
does, but he also has the children almost as often as well. This debt service adds several 
hundred dollars per month to Charles's monthly expenses. With more disposable income, 
a fair result would be for Mary to bear the larger portion of the marital debt. 
There are no findings as to what facts the court relied on when it ordered Charles 
to pay 80% of the income tax debt. This issue should be remanded with the other issues 
above for the court to enter findings in support of its order. 
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D. Attorneys Fees. 
The court ordered Charles to pay $6,880 of Mary's attorney fee bill. 
{Findings paragraph 28). The court finds generally that "Plaintiff has the need for 
assistance with her attorney fees and Defendant has the ability to pay." {Findings 
paragraph 26). However, the court does not make any detailed findings applying the facts 
of this. The ratio of Charles' share of Mary's bill is the same as the ratio applied by the 
court in dividing the marital. However, this similarity is not explained by the court. 
There is no finding to explain this ratio other than that the gross income of Charles in 
1996 was 80% of the household income. (Ex.3). This fraction seems especially 
insignificant after the court has cause Mary to actually have more disposable income than 
Charles has with the court's award of alimony and child support. (Ex. 3, Add. B). 
"An award of fees must be based upon findings of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees." Willeyv. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Utah App. 1996). Where the 
award is based on need, the trial court must support the award with adequate findings 
detailing the reasonableness of the amount awarded and the need of the receiving party. 
Finlayson v. Finlayson 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 
(Utah App. 1991). 
** 
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In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991), the record contained 
"substantial evidence" of the parties' financial situation and the reasonableness of the fee. 
And, "one very general finding addressed financial need." This court reversed the award 
and remanded for redetermination because the findings failed to evaluate the relevant 
factors in concluding there was no need to award any fee. / d.; see also Adelman v. 
Adelman, 815 P.2d 741, 746 (Utah 1991) (the award of attorneys fees in enforcement 
proceeding must be based on finding of need); Rudman, 812 P.2d at 79-80, (Orme, J., 
concurring, cautions against starting with the award and then working backwards to 
attempt to support it.) 
When there are no findings to support a claim of a reasonable fee award or of need 
to an award, the fee award must be reversed. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 
App. 1991) (no finding or evidence of wife's need for fees); Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494. 
There was also no evidence as to Mary's inability to pay her fees. Mary built into 
her expense affidavit, referred to in the findings as the basis for her alimony award, a 
monthly counselor's/attorney's fee payment of $125.00 presumably this will enable her to 
pay her attorney's fee bill. Further, the undisputed evidence is that Charles has at least 
$426/month. less disposable income than Mary after his support payments, while having 
the children 45% of the time. (Tr. 3, 96-97). In addition, Charles has his own unpaid 
attorneys fee and $15,200.00 of marital debt to pay. 
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Mary's attorney fee award is unsupported by any factual finding of need or of 
Charles' There was no testimony by Mary that she could not afford to pay her attorney's 
fees, ability to pay. Considering the lack of factual findings, the award of attorney fee 
should be reversed. 
Point 2 
The trial court erred in excluding Charles's witness regarding Ms. Rehn's 
underemployment and income potential. 
Defendant informed plaintiffs attorney by written fax two days before trial that he 
intended to call an vocational expert witness which had been retained that day. The 
witness was disclosed as soon as Charles attorney located and retained the witness. (Tr. 
81). The day before trial the court suggested to counsel that the matter be continued for 
the very purpose of allowing plaintiff to obtain an expert on the issue of plaintiff s 
employability. The telephone conference entered with an agreement between the court 
and counsel in a request to plaintiffs counsel that he be allowed to contact his client 
regarding the court's suggestion. Plaintiffs counsel later left a message that his client 
had agreed to the continuance. (Tr. 80,82) It was only after defendant's attorney had 
received the message from Mary's attorney that he called the court and set a new trial 
date for January 15, 1998. Upon relaying that message to Mr. Cathcart, Mr. Cathcart said 
he was not going to wait until January, he was going to trial the next day. 
In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 294 
(Utah App. 1992), the court stated: 
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The court's power to sanction a party for failure to cooperate 
in discovery comes from Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides that if a party fails to obey 
an order, entered under Rule 26(f), the court may prohibit the 
offending party from introducing designated matters into 
evidence. 
At the trial, Mary's attorney did not make a motion in limine to exclude the 
witness who he now knew would be testifying for the defense. At the end of the trial, 
when Mr. White was called to testify, plaintiffs attorney objected that this testimony was 
prejudicial to his client because she needed finality to the divorce. The court did not cite 
any rule or authority at law under which it was excluding the witness. The basis of the 
court's exclusion of the witness was that the witness' identity was disclosed at the 
eleventh hour which did not give Mary a chance to retain her own expert witness. (Tr. 
84). 
The expert vocational witness would testify as to the issues addressed by Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78-45-7.5 (7)(b): "employment potential and probable earnings as derived 
from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community." Id. This crucial testimony to establishing 
Mary's ability to earn at a higher wage level with her experience and credentials may 
have persuaded the judge to have taken a different outlook on the alimony factors in 
Jones. If Charles established through this witness that Mary is very employable at a 
higher wage, then he would also likely show that she had the ability to provide for more 
or all of her own needs. 
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In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 296 
(Utah App. 1992), the court went on to state: 
We hold that absent an order creating a judicially imposed 
deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party by excluding 
its witnesses under rule 37(b)(2). See Inner City Wrecking 
Co. v. Bilsky, 51 Ohio App.2d 220, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 
(1977) (without an order compelling compliance with court 
rules,m the sanction imposed by trial court was beyond its 
authority)s in. 
In this case, none of the four scheduling orders produced by the court required 
that witnesses be disclosed by a certain deadline. (Addendum D). Charles' attorney was 
not in violation of any court order by designating an expert witness two days before trial. 
In Berrett, the court reversed for a new trial. As in Berrett, the trial court here 
abused its discretion. The court should reverse the trial court decision and remand for a 
new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award to Mary of child support on the sole custody guidelines the 
award of $1200.00/month of alimony, the allocation of debt and the award of fees should 
be reversed and remanded for the court to enter sufficient findings. Because substantial 
rights of Charles were prejudiced by the erroneous exclusion of Charles' vocational 
expert, this case should be remanded for a new trial of this case. 
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Respectfully submitted this / day of May 1998. 
HENRIOD, NIELSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Steve S. Christensen 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing A P P E L L A N T ' S B R I E F was 
mailed first class, postage prepaid on the 7th day of May 1998 to: 
Terry L. Cathcart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
380 North 200 West, #103 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
380 North 200 West. #103 
Bountiftil, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 295-2391 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARY J. REHN. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES C. REHN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 964300048 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiff's Complaint for Divorce and Defendant's Counter-Claim for Divorce were heard 
before the coun in trial on August 14, 1997, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge presiding. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by her counsel, Terry L, Cathcart; Defendant was present 
and represented by his counsel, Steve S. Christensen. 
The court having reviewed all of the exhibits admitted by both Plaintiff and Defendant, 
having reviewed the law applicable to this matter and having heard argument for both counsel, 
now enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The coun rules on this matter in a fair, even-handed manner, to inspire fairness by §* ** 
Plaintiff to Defendant and Defendant to Plaintiff. * *%' ^ ::S~' <r '* 
CL. ~rc-
2. There was a time in the parties' relationship when they loved each other dearly. 
They entered into a marriage relationship and for nearly 20 years lived together as a family unit. 
3. Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Summit County, Utah, and has been for a 
period in excess of three (3) months immediately preceding the commencement of this action. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having been married in Story City, 
Iowa, (Story County), on August 27, 1977. 
5. During the course of the marriage the parties have become unable to resolve or 
reconcfle their differences; these irreconcilable differences have led to the complete breakdown 
of the marital relationship. 
6. After looking careftilly at all of the exhibits entered with the court, the court now 
focuses on the two or three exhibits that become the heart and soul of the court's ruling. 
7. Plaintiff's monthly expenses, as listed in Plaintiff's Exhibit #2, appear to be 
reasonable for three (3) people. The court finds that $3300 is not an unreasonable monthly 
expense for a mother and two (2) children, when the two (2) children are going to become more 
expensive with the passing of every month in their lives. 
8. Historically, and as far as the court can sec into the future, the ability to earn 
income definitely favors Defendant. 
9> The ratio of earned income is approximately 80 percent of the total family income 
attributable to Defendant's wages and 20 percent attributable to Plaintiffs wages. 
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10. There has been no basis to contend or evidence entered that Plaintiff has been 
unwilling to try or has been lacking in her effort to pull her share. 
11. The record is unchallenged that for months on end, Plaintiff has worked on 
weekends and holidays to provide for her family. 
12. She has scrounged for multiple jobs, some of them perhaps less dignified and less 
rewarding financially and otherwise than she would have liked to have, but nevertheless, she has 
bent her back and gone to work. 
13. There is no issue of unemployment or underemployment based on the historical 
roles Plaintiff and Defendant have assumed in this marriage. 
14. Plaintiff has been the primary care taker of the children. 
15. The children have been young; die youngest is just barely entering into the first 
grade. 
16. The emphasis of the parties has been properly placed in making sure that the 
children have been cared for properly by their mother. 
17. Therefore, in deciding the issues of money, the court finds that the ratio of 80 
percent attributable to Defendant and 20 percent attributable to Plaintiff is appropriate in light of 
the evidence. 
18. Child support in this case has been stipulated to, pursuant to the guidelines, and 
should be awarded in accordance with those guidelines. (See Child Support Schedule entered as 
Plaintiff s Exhibit #5), 
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19. Child support should be ordered to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff in the amount 
of $ 1045 per month, one-half (V4) of that amount to be paid on the fifth (5th) and one-half (Vi) 
of the twentieth (20th) of each month beginning immediately. (See PlaintifTs Exhibit 5). 
20. Regarding the monthly expenses of die parties, the court finds that in nearly every 
case that coxnes before the court, the parties are simply going to have to tighten up their belts and 
make do with less, and that is certainly no exception in this case. 
21. The debt that can and should be attributable as marital debt is the debt to the IRS 
in the approximate amount of $19,000. 
22. The court finds that the IRS debt is a marital debt and the debt should be ordered 
to be paid 80 percent by Defendant and 20 percent by Plaintiff, 
23. That debt may possibly be reduced by further negotiations with the IRS, but 
whatever the ultimate, final debt is, it should be ordered to be paid on that basis. 
24. There are no other marital debts that need be addressed by the court or paid by the 
parties. 
25. There have been approximately $8600 incurred by Plaintiff in legal fees and costs. 
26. The court finds that Plaintiff has the need for assistance with her attorney*s fees and 
Defendant has the ability to pay. 
27. Further, the fees were necessarily incurred by Plaintiff in this matter; the work 
accomplished was reasonable given the scope and time of the case, and the charge pet hour by 
PlaintifTs counsel was appropriate for his experience, the nature of the work accomplished and 
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the rates normally charged by attorneys of his experience and expertise. 
28. Defendant should be ordered to pay 80 percent of those fees and costs, or a stun 
of $6880 to be paid by Defendant for Plaintiffs attorney's fees. 
29. The court has considered a number of principles, both equitable and legal in nature 
to determine the appropriate award of alimony. 
30. This is a 20-year marriage where alimony is appropriate. Alimony should be 
awarded permanently for at least 20 years, until, if and when, there is a legal event that would 
terminate the payment or the receipt of alimony. 
31. The desire of the court is, as far as possible, to fairly and evenly establish a living 
standard for the parties which may be virtually impossible to achieve with exactness, but 
nevertheless, the court believes that there are principles that will accomplish that for die most part. 
32. Plaintiffs needs are set at approximately $3300 per month for her and two (2) 
children, (See Plaintiff s Exhibit 2). 
33. Those needs are reasonable and are real. 
34. Plaintiffs established spendable income, working as industriously as possible, has 
historically resulted in $1072 per month in income from her various jobs. (See Plaintiffs Exhibits 
1 and 3). 
35. Child support has been ordered to be paid in the amount of $1045 per month. 
36. The court finds that alimony should be ordered to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff 
in the amount of $1200 per month permanently, one-half (V4) of that amount to be paid on the fifth 
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(5th) and one-half (V4) on the twentieth (20th) of each month until terminated by law. 
37. Defendant clearly has the ability to pay and Plaintiff clearly has the need for 
support. 
38. Alimony has been carefully considered factoring in the length of the marriage, 
disparity in the abilities of the parties to earn income, die historical roles of both parties have 
played in this family during the 20-year marriage, the age of the little children who are the 
primary responsibility of the Plaintiff, and all other pertinent factors. 
39. Adding Plaintiffs historical gross monthly income of $1072, monthly child support 
as awarded by the court of $1045 and $1200 in alimony, Plaintiff will receive approximately 
$3317. 
40* Her needs are well established at $3317 and the award of alimony is as fair and 
even as the court is capable of ruling. 
41. The court will not set a review in this matter. If either party believes the question 
of family support should be reviewed, they may request that review and the court will determine 
whether or not the requirements set forth within the statute regarding change of circumstances 
have been met. 
42. Furthermore, the court finds that the parties have agreed and stipulated to certain 
items as follows: 
A. ^ygTQPY: Each party should be awarded the joint legal care, custody and 
control of the minor children, to wit: 
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Kyle McKensie, d.o.b. 3/11/S8; and 
Shawn Clinton, d.o.b. 3/12/91. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff should be designated as the primary physical ctistodian and 
Defendant the secondary physical custodian. 
B. VISITATION: Defendant should be awarded the standard and reasonable 
visitation in accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35. Furthermore, Defendant should 
be prohibited from using alcohol immediately before or during visitation. 
C. fiEAL pftQPERTY: There is no real property owned by the parties and thus 
no allocation is necessary. 
D. PERSONAL PROPERTY: Personal property should be awarded on the 
following basis: 
(1) Plaintiff: 
(a) all items of her personal clothing, jewelry and other personal 
effects; 
(b) one-half (V4) of Defendant's retirement and retirement 
accounts which were accrued during the marriage; 
(c) 1996 Impreza Outback automobile; and 
(d) one-half (Vi) of any of Defendant's stock and investment 
holdings. 
(2) Defendant: 
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(a) all items of his personal clothing, jewelry and other personal 
effects; 
(b) the remainder of his retirement benefits, after the portion 
awarded to Plaintiff, which were accrued during the marriage, and all such benefits which were 
accrued before the marriage; 
(c) 1995 Honda Accord automobile; and 
(d) one-half (V4) of any of Defendant's stock aAd investment 
holdings. 
E. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Each party should be ordered to MY one-half 
(V4) of any work- or education-related child care expenses incurred by either party. 
F. INCOME TAX RFTTJRN: Each party should be ordered to file jointly for 
tax year 1996 and divide any refund received from that filing. If there is any liability from that 
filing, Plaintiff should be ordered to pay 20 percent of that liability and Defendant 80 percent of 
that liability. 
G. INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS: Plaintiff should be awarded the income 
tax deductions and exemptions for the minor children. If Defendant is current in all child support 
and child care payments for the year in question as of December 31 of that tax year, Defendant 
may take the exemptions and deductions for the minor children by reimbursing Plaintiff the 
amount she pays iA taxes over and above the amount she would pay had she kept the exemptions 
and deductions. Defendant should be ordered to pay that reimbursement to Plaintiff on or before 
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April 10, five (5) days prior to the filing deadline. 
H . HEALTH AND ACCIDENT I N S U R A N T Defendant should h* onW»rf 
to provide health and accident insurance for die minor children with each party paying one-half 
(V£) of any out-of-pocket expenses. Furthermore, Defendant should be ordered to help coordinate 
and insure Plaintiff is provided access to COBRA coverage under his insurance so long as 
allowable by law. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay for any coverage for herself under the 
COBRA plan. 
I. LIF^ ? INS1 FRANCE: Defendant should be ordered to maintain the current 
policies of life insurance in the amount of $80,000 and $50,000 each, naming the children and 
Plaintiff as beneficiaries so long as child support and alimony are payable to the children and 
Plaintiff. Should alimony terminate. Defendant should be ordered to name the children as sole 
beneficiaries of those policies. 
J. ORDER T O WTTHHOLD AND DELIVER: An order to withhold and 
deliver is authorized although not implemented so long as Defendant maintains an automatic bank 
transfer of all of his support payments from his checking account direcdy to Plaintiff's in the 
appropriate amounts and times as ordered in the Decree. If implemented, Defendant should be 
ordered to pay any administrative cost of the withholding, 
K. DIYQRCE EPVCATON CLASS: Each party has completed the Divorce 
Education Class. 
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L. STQN ALL. PAPERS: Each party should be ordered to sign all papers, 
documents, titles, deeds, etc., necessary to effectuate the transfer of personal property by and 
between the parties as set forth. 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters its: 
CONTUSIONS OF LAW 
Each party should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other to become final upon 
entry on the records of the court. 
All other issues between the parties should be ordered in accordance with the Findings 
above, 
DATED September *flj?6 > 1997. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
P£T B. BRIAN 
District Judge 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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PLAINTIFF'S 1996 W-2 TNCOMF 
Dan'sFoods $11,103.84 
Premier Resorts 2,535.31 
Closet Space 714.41 
University of Utah 2.800.00 
TOTAL: $ 17,153.56 
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PLAINTIFFS MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Rent $520 
Renter's Insurance 13 
Maintenance (residence)(appliance maintenance/replacement) 50 
Food and household supplies 500 
Utilities (electricity and heat) 50 
Telephone 50 
Laundry and cleaning 50 
Clothing 150 
Medical (asthma prescriptions/allergy medications/podiatrist/optometrist) 125 
Dental (Orthodontist, Kyle's retainer/braces(?)) 50 
Medical/Dental Insurance 185 
Child care 136 
School (children and myself) 150 
Entertainment (memberships, travel, recreation, camps, sports) 345 
Incidentals (grooming, alcohol, gifts and donations) 200 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) 226 
Auto payments 341 
Installment payment(s) (counselor and attorney's fees) 125 
Other expenses (taxes) 50 
TOTAL: $3316 
ALIMONY COMPUTATIONS 
Elaiaiiff: Defendant: 
$ 1428 per month gross $ 6833 per month gross 
x .75 net after taxes x .75 net after taxes 
$1072 net $5125 net 
[214] [child support] [10451 [child support] 
$ 858 $4080 
JfiLL alimony [1611] [alimony] 
$2469 $2469 
Therefore, Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff alimony of $1,611 
for the length of the marriage (20 years) or until earlier terminated by law. 
TRIAL EXHIBIT 3 
IN T"H THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN ANb—OR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF ITkwI 
MARY J. REHN, 
vs. 
CHARLES C. REHN, 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLS CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civil No. 964300048 DA 
8. 
9. 
10. 
1 1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother | and father for whom support is to be awarded. ! 
8 Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 
8 
H 2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do 
1 not enter alimony ordered for this case) 
I 2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter 
1 obligations ordered for the children in Line 1). 
i 2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the 
1 Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
I 3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted 
8 Gross Income for child support purposes. 
B 4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of 
fl children in Line 1 to the Support Table, Find the Base 
B Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
1 5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the 
1 COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
1 6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each 
1 parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. 
MOTHER 
iiuumuit | 
///////////// ! 
$ 1,429 
$ 1,429 
///////////// 
///////////// 
1 ///////////// 
0.17 
J $ 214 
FATHER 
///////////// 1 
///////////// 
$ 6,833 
$ 6,833 
I ///////////// 
///////////// 
///////////// 
0.83 
$ 1,045 
bmamsemameaaBs^mmmmm 
COMBINED 
~TH 
///////////// | 
///////////// I 
///////////// 8 
imiiitimi J 
litiiiiniin | ///////////// ] 
///////////// | 
ill ill Ml lit | 
S 8,262 1 
' $ 1.259 | 
///////////// | 
Uillllltllll | 
j iiiiumiiii 1 
///////////// j 
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for (he 
Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table. j $ 1,043 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother (x) Father 
Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7? (x) Yes ( ) No 
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $ , and answer number 10. 
What were the reasons stttted by the court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) other: _ _ 
Attorney Bar No. 4809 ( ) Electronic Filing (x) Manual Filing 
TRIAL EXHIBIT 5 
TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
380 North 200 West, #103 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 29S-2391 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 964300048 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiffs Complaint for Divorce and Defendant's Counter-CIaim for Divorce were heard 
before the court in trial on August 14, 1997, the Honorable Pat B, Brian, District Judge presiding. 
Plaintiff was present and represented fay her counsel, Terry L. Cathcart; Defendant was present 
and represented by his counsel, Steve S. Christensen. 
The court having reviewed all of the exhibits admitted by both Plaintiff and Defendant, 
having reviewed the law applicable to this matter, having heard argument for both counsel, and 
having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law> now enters its: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. DECREE: Each party is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other to become 
final upon entry on the records of the court. 0 **% 
2. CUSTODY: Each party is awarded the joint legal care, custody and control of the 
minor children, to wit: 
Kyle McKensic, d.o.b. 3/11/88; and 
Shawn Clinton, d.o.b. 3/12/91. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff is designated as the primary physical custodian and Defendant the 
secondary physical custodian. 
3. VISITATION: Defendant is awarded the standard and reasonable visitation in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35. Furthermore, Defendant is prohibited from 
using alcohol immediately before or during visitation. 
4. PERSONAL PROPERTY: Personal property is awarded on the following basis: 
A- Plaintiff: 
(1) all items of her personal clothing, jewelry and other personal effects; 
(2) one-half (V£) of Defendant's retirement and retirement accounts 
which were accrued during the marriage; 
(3) 1996 Impreza Outback automobile; and 
(4) one-half (%) of any of Defendant's stock and investment holdings. 
B. Defendant: 
(1) all items of his personal clothing, jewelry and other personal effects; 
(2) the remainder of his retirement benefits, after the portion awarded 
to Plaintiff, which we e accrued during the marriage, and all such benefits which were accrued 
Decree of Divorce 
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before the marriage; 
(3) 1995 Honda Accord automobile; and 
(4) one-half (V4) of any of Defendant's stock and investment holdings, 
5. CHILD SUPPORT: Child support is ordered to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff 
in die amount of $1045 per month, one-half (%) of that amount to be paid on the fifth (5th) and 
one-half (Vi) of the twentieth (20th) of each month beginning immediately. (See Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 5). 
6. CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Each party is ordered to pay one-half (V4) of any 
work- or education-related child care expenses incurred by either party. 
7. ALIMONY : Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff alimony in the amount of 
$1200 per month permanently, one-half (lA) of that amount to be paid on the fifth (5th) and one-
half (Vi) on the twentieth (20th) of each month until terminated by law. 
8. DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: Each party is ordered to pay their own separate 
debts. The only marital debt to be paid is the debt to the IRS in the approximate amount of 
$19,000, or as may be negotiated later by the parties. Defendant is ordered to pay 80 percent of 
the final amount of that debt and Plaintiff 20 percent of the final amount. 
9. INCOME TAX RETURN: Each party is ordered to file jointly for tax year 1996 
and divide any reftmd received from that filing. If there is any liability from that filing, Plaintiff 
is ordered to pay 20 percent of that liability and Defendant 80 percent of that liability. 
Decree of Divorce 
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10. INCOME TAX DEDyCTCONS: Plaintiff is awarded the income tax deductions and 
exemptions for the minor children. If Defendant is current in all child support and child care 
payments for the year in question as of December 31 of that tax year, Defendant may take the 
exemptions and deductions for the minor children by reimbursing Plaintiff the amount she pays 
in taxes over and above the amount she would pay had she kept the exemptions and deductions. 
Defendant is ordered to pay that reimbursement to Plaintiff on or before April 10, five (5) days 
prior to the filing deadline. 
11. HEALTH AND ACCTOEOT INSURANCE^ 
and accident insurance for die minor children with each party paying one-half (%) of any out-of-
pocket expenses. Furthermore, Defendant is ordered to help coordinate and insure Plaintiff is 
provided access to COBRA coverage under his insurance so long as allowable by law. Plaintiff 
is ordered to pay for any coverage for herself under the COBRA plan. 
12. LIFE INSURANCE: Defendant is ordered to maintain the current policies of life 
insurance in the amount of $80,000 and $50,000 each, naming the children and Plaintiff as 
beneficiaries so long as child support and alimony are payable to the children and Plaintiff. 
Should alimony terminate. Defendant is ordered to name the children as sole beneficiaries of those 
policies. 
13. ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER: An order to withhold and deliver is 
authorized although not implemented so long as Defendant maintains an automatic bank transfer 
of all of his support payments from his checking account directly to Plaintiff* $ in the appropriate 
Decree of Divorce 
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amounts and times as, ordered in the Decree if" implemented, Defendant is ordered, to pay any 
administrative cost -' - x itMioidtog. 
II - i JOSTS A N p /sJTORNEY'S FEES: Deieudani is ordered, to pay to Plaintiff for 
her attorney'" & fees .and costs in this matter die amount of $6880, Plaintiff is awarded a judgment 
for Ifia! amount. 
SiGM ALL PAPERS: E a ^ pari;, _ :,, „ , ^ ... papers, documents, titles, 
ii 11. .,, etc., necessary to effectuate the transfer of personal property ^v uut between the parties 
as set forth. 
DATED September eTVJ' 
M. PAT B . BRIAN 
District Judge 
AS TO FORM: 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
ree of Divorce 
***** CONFIRMATION COPY ***** 
MARY J RE* CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET (SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
hum HAMMMH 1,11 \ 
CHARLES C. RJU^N 
MOTHER FATHER COMBINED 
mtmmmr— i ^ » « » a « a a » « ^ ^ • TIMTTT— n •a: I-HI u» • — ' • • i y 
1 1 Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother ] 
1 and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
1 2a. Enter the fathers and mother's gross monthly income. | Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 
I 2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (0 
K not enter alimony ordered for this case) 
3 2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter 
I obligations ordered for the children in line i). 
1 2d. OPTIONAL; Enter the amount from Line 12 of ihe 
1 Children in Present Home Worksheet for cither parent. | 
1 3. Subtract Lines 2bt 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted 
1 Gross Income for child support purposes. 
1 4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of | children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base 
1 Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
1 5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 ' 
1 COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
1 6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each 
I parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. 
///////////// 
///////////// 
$ _ _ 1_L429 
mm0mmmmmmmmmmmmm , — . . — » . 
$ 1,429 
1111111111111 
! ///////////// 
, iiunmmi 
0.17 
$ 214 
Lyrin • « • •HogeaasBsssB 
timmuiii 
mninniii 
$ 6,833 
S 6,833 
I nmtimm 
mm turni 
ntmiiHiii 
0.83 
S 1,045 
, ' . ' „ : • : . : - -., • iv i —uu 
~4 
iiiiiiiituii | 
imiiiiiiiit i 
inuiiiwn 8 
mmmtm 1 
mi i mum 
iituiimm « 
mm/mm 8 
immmm 1 
S 8,262 | 
$ 1,259 | 
[m/immii | 
mmimiii 9 
m mum it \ 
\ m mi mm \ 
1 T BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the j 
Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table. I $ 1, 
S. Which parent is die obligor? ( ) Mother (x) Father 
9 Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7? (x) Yes 
If NOt enter the amount ordered: $ _, and answer numbe* 
\0 "Wtoat ^ we*fc the reason* sm**i V; • •'* wort foi ihe deviation! ! 
< ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
< ) other: _ __^^ _ _ _ _ 
Attorney Bar No, 4S09 () Electronic Filing (X> Manual Filing 
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(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or 
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall 
enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after default 
of the respondent, upon the petitioner's affidavit, 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court 
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of 
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of 
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
History: ILS. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L. " - ;*> -.i • - - -:V - jly 
1909,ch.60, § 1;C.L. 1917, § 2999;R.S. 1933 * • r i .dii-i-r 
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, an J -respmut. 'deiciid* mivugncji 
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116, the section 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1; Jhp 1997 anie. jment bv ch 157 effe 
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch. v; , 1997. m uDsection i l
 f\ c. deietec 
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1; ,. . .
 a i n t l f f h a , - : i e a a n a c t i o n m t h e ]UC 
1997, ch. 47, § 2; 1997, ch. 157, § 1.
 ; . a s d e f i n e ( J ^ S e c t l o n 78_1_2 .1 w n e r , _ 
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amend- , . orogram shall be administered" arter 
ment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second
 o r c h l l d r e r - m t h e first sentence and 
sentence of Subsection (1Kb) and in the second uvhstir chances 
sentence of Subsection (IKd) substituted "shall "" " a ^ 
* i . u j » r « i _ n i j ^ i r s j section is set out as reconciled bv the 
enter the decree for shall make and file find- ~
 T « , j j „ j j , , ., , , . - v Legislative Kesearcn \nd l reneral ings and decree and added the language begin-
 / .
 fc 
ning "or, in the case o f at the end. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
(\ v». en a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in. it 
equitabit- orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(in) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
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incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment oi 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary, 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer tc 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or" 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault : :( the pai ties in detei mining 
alimony, 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal 
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
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(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spoi Lse's financial 
ability to share living expenses, 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
tne court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; CX. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, 
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330, 
§ 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1,1995, deleted a provision 
from Subsection (3) for support and mainte-
nance orders; deleted former Subsections (5) 
and (6), providing that alimony terminates 
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a mem-
ber of the opposite sex, by the payee; added 
Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Sub-
sections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made 
stylistic changes. 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, 
substituted "Recovery Services" for "Parts 4 
and 5" in Subsection (l)(d) and deleted Subsec-
tion (l)(e) which provided for an assesment 
against the obligor for a check handling fee. 
Compi le r ' s Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 330, 
which amended this section, provides in § 2 
that the Legislature does not intend that ter-
mination of alimony based on cohabitation, in 
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted 
in any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose," 
30-3-5 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compi ler ' s Notes. — In 1997, the Utah 
legislature changed the designation of parties 
in domestic relations cases from "plaintiff* and 
"defendant" to "petitioner" and "respondent." 
Annotations from decisions before the amend-
ments will not reflect these changes in termi-
nology. 
ANALYSIS 
Alimony and support, 
—Amount. 
Imputed income, 
—Cohabitation by payee, 
Attorney fees. 
Child custody. 
—Factors considered. 
Child support. 
—Estoppel. 
Health insurance. 
Property division. 
—Preliminary orders. 
—Retirement funds. 
—Unilateral transfer. 
Stipulations and agreements of parties. 
Alimony a n d supp o r t . 
• Amount 
—- -—Impute• MM nine. 
Trial cnurt relying on evidence sufficiently 
detailed in its findings of fact, did not abuse its 
discretion in imputing income to defendant 
spouse for purposes ofdetermining her alimony 
;
 rard. Willey v. Willey, 914 R2d 1149 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
- C o h a b i t a t i o n by payee . 
Findings by trial court that former spouse 
and person of the opposite sex had a sexual 
relationship, shared living expenses, had open 
access to each other's condominiums, ate to-
gether and shared food expenses, kept clothing 
in the same condominium, used the same fur-
niture and otherwise lived as though they were 
husband and wife supported the finding of 
cohabitation. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
Evidence that former wife's current lover had 
• key to her house, spent four or five nights a 
A-eek there even if she was away, and kept 
clothing and other personal effects at her home 
supported conclusion that the couple were in 
fact residing together, and this, combined with 
sexual relationship, was enough to terminate 
the former husband's obligation to pay alimony 
under the divorce decree. Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
"Ii ttorney fees. 
Because wife did not comply with 'visitation 
order contained in her decree, there was no 
abuse of discretion by court in awarding attor-
ney fees to husband, the prevailing party. Sigg 
v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah, Ct. App. 1995), 
Child cuhl fl i 
—Factors considered. 
In a child custody suit, the maternal grand 
parents failed to prove that no strong mutual 
bond existed between the child and the natural 
father, that the natural father was unwilling to 
sacrifice his own interest and welfare for his 
child's, and that the father lacked the sympa-
thy for and understanding of the child that is 
generally characteristic of parents; conse-
quently, the maternal grandparents failed to 
rebut the parental presumption, which favored 
the child's natural father. Duncan v. Howard, 
918 R2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Child support. 
—Estoppel. 
Former wife's delay in claiming former hus-
band was making insufficient payments was 
not enough to estop her from seeking reim-
bursement for payments former husband was 
legally obligated to make to his children. Ball v. 
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Hea l th i n s u r a n c e . 
The trial court has broad discretion under 
this section to credit one or both parents, as the 
court deems equitable, for the coverage pro-
vided by a third party; thus, trial court could 
credit wife for current husband's insurance 
coverage of wife's and her former husband's 
children. Ball v. Peterson, 912 P2d 1006 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
P r o p e r t y divis ion. 
— P r e l i m i n a r y o rde r s . 
Decedent's unilateral self-conveyance sever-
ing joint tenancy and her conveyance of her 
interest in the residence to the trustees of a 
revocable trust did not violate the trial court's 
order that she and her husband, parties to a 
divorce action, neither sell, encumber, nor 
mortgage their assets pending the proceedings, 
because it did not result in the removal of 
property from the court's jurisdiction. 
Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 
1996). 
—Retirement funds. 
Retirement funds accumulated in a 401(a) 
plan during marriage are marital assets and 
were appropriately considered by the trial 
court. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
•— Uni la t e ra l t ransfer , 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to reach funds transferred 
by the husband to the children pursuant to the 
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act; however, in 
making equitable division between the spouses, 
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the court may take into consideration transfers 
made by the husband at the expense of the wife 
and hold him accountable for dissipation of 
marital assets. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 
835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Stipulations and a g r e e m e n t s of" pa r t i e s . 
Court of Appeals would not accept downward 
adjustments to parties' stipulated expenses 
without any evidence upon which to base such 
factual findings, other than the trial court's 
apparent pursuit of round numbers. Willey v. 
Willey, 914 P.2d 11.49 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R, — Child custody: 
— age of parent as factor in awarding cus-
tody, 34 AX.R.5th 57. 
Child support: 
— loss of income due to incarceration as 
affecting child support obligation, 27 A.L.R.5th 
540. 
— right to credit on child support payments 
for social security or other government depen-
dency payments made for benefit of child, 34 
A.L.R.5th 447. 
Property settlement: 
— workers' compensation benefits as marital 
property subject to distribution, 30 AX.R.5th 
139. 
Miscellaneous: 
— treatment of depreciation expenses 
claimed for tax or accounting purposes in de-
termining ability to pay child or spousal sup-
port, 28 A.L.R.5th 46. 
30-3-5.1. V i s l O l i l u i 
port order. 
e withholding ii 1 • shild si lp-
Whenever a court enters an order tor child support, it shall include in the 
order a provision for withholding income as a means of collecting child support 
as provided in Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 30-3-5.1, enac t ed by L. 
1985, ch. 11, § 1; 1993, ch. 4, § 70; 1996, ch. 
244, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, added Income 
Withholding." 
HI. eiiecuve July 1, 1997, 
^ Services" for "Part 4, 
d- A 
30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse 
— Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for modification of a 
divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, 
implicating either party, the court shall order that an investigation be 
conducted by the Division of Child and Family Services within the Department 
of Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4a. A final award of 
custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on that investigation 
is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division 
of Child and Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and request 
for an investigation In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with 
Section 78-7-9, 
His to ry : C. 1953, 30-3-5.2, enac t ed by L. 
1988, ch . 90, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 14; 1992, 
ch. 213, § 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 48; 1996, ch. 318, 
§ 2. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment by ch. 79, effective April 29, 1996, cor-
rected the reference to Chapter 4a. 
I'lie 1996 amendment by ch. 318, effective 
April 29, 199r* .. rted "Child- and" in two 
places and subs:.• . • ed "Chapter 4aw for "Chap-
ter 4, Part 5 r «i tiie end of the first sentence. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
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78-45 2 Befinitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adjusted gross income''means income calculated under Subsection 
78-45-7.6(1). 
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Reco\ ei y Sei » ices or 
the Department of Human Services. 
(3) "Administrative order" means an order that has been issued by the 
Office of Recovery Services, the Department of Human Services, or an 
administrative agency of another state or other comparable jurisdiction 
with similar authority to that of the office. 
(4) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered 
and is calculated using the guidelines before additions for medical ex-
penses and work-related child care costs. 
(5) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support 
table," "base child support obligation table," "low income table," or "table" 
means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-7.14. 
(6) "Child" means: 
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise 
emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed 
forces of the United States; 
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high 
school during the normal and expected year of graduation and not 
otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the 
armed forces of the United States; or 
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated fnnii tj,truing 
a living and is without sufficient means. 
(7) "Child support" is defined in Section 62A-11-401 
(8) "Child support order" or "support order" is defined in Section 
62A-11-401. 
(9) "Court" means the district eoui • -
(10) "Guidelines" means the child si -.elines in Sections 78-45-
7.2 through 78-45-7.21. 
(11) "Income" is defined in Section 62A-11-303. 
(12) "IV-D" means Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
601 et seq. 
(13) "Joint physical custody" means the child stays with each parent 
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support. 
(14) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related 
insurance costs. 
(15) "Obligee" is defined in Section 62A-11-103. 
(16) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
(17) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Depart-
ment of Human Services. 
(18) "Parent" includes a a 
stepparent. 
(19) "Split custody" means mat each parent nat- -ri*.<ica* eu>tocr. ui at 
least one of the children. 
(20) "State" includes any state, territory, or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(21) "Stepchild" means any child having a stepparent. 
(22) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's 
natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or 
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(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this 
chapter. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch sections (IXa) and (2), added "or adjustment 
146, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3; under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been made" 
1990, ch. 100, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994, to the end of Subsection (l)(a), and in Subsec-
' ch. 140, § 14; 1997, ch. 232, § 71. tion (2) inserted "or a petition to modify an 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "sub- filed." 
stantial change" for "material change" in Sub-
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing 
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considei -
ations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with 
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the 
provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the 
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or orderiiig an 
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappro-
priate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of 
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the 
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting 
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obliga-
tions of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations 
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before 
determining the award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or 
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a 
decrease in the award. 
(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the 
previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition 
the court to adjust the amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6)(a), the court shall, 
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether 
there is a difference between the amount ordered and the amount that 
would be required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or 
more and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust 
the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary 
for an adjustment under Subsection (6)(b). 
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the 
court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances 
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(b) For purposes of Subsection (7)(a), a substantial change in circum-
stances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent 
for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall, 
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether a 
substantial change has occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine 
whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more between the 
amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required 
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not 
of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support 
ordered to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (6) 
and (7) shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after 
July 1, 1997. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990, ment, effective July 1,1997 rewrote Subsection 
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4; 1997, ch. 232, (6) and added Subsections (7) and (8). 
§ 72. 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the 
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family 
Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disabil-
ity Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
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determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Department of Workforce Services 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. § 1; 1997, ch. 174, § 68; 1997, ch. 375, § 322. 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ch. 118, § 7; 1996, ch. 171, § 1; 1997, ch. 29, ment by ch. 29, effective May 5, 1997, substi-
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tuted "shalT for "may" in Subsection (8Kb). The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 174, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Department of 
July 1, 1997, rewrote Subsection (3)(a) which Workforce Services" for "Office of Employment 
read lAid to Families with Dependent Children Security* in Subsection (5)(b). 
(AFDC)* and substituted "Supplemental Secu- This section has been set out as reconciled by 
rity Income, Social Security Disability Insur- the Office of Legislative Research and General 
ance" for "S.S.I." in Subsection (3)(b). Counsel. 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award 
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a 
client of cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family 
Employment Program, any agreement by the parties for reduction of child 
support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative 
agency. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent 
shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement 
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the 
number of children included in the award. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.11, enacted by L. of cash assistance provided under Title 35A, 
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9; 1994, Chapter 8, Part 3, Family Employment Pro-
ch. 118, § 12; 1997, ch. 174, § 69. gram" for "recipient of Aid to Families with 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Dependent Children" in the second sentence of 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "client Subsection (1). 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and func-
tions. 
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, the governor shall appoint an advisory 
committee consisting of: 
(a) one representative recommended by the Office of Recovery Services; 
(b) one representative recommended by the Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion; 
(d) two representatives of noncustodial parents, one male and one 
female, appointed by the governor; 
(e) two representatives of custodial parents, one male and one female, 
appointed by the governor; and 
(f) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed three, who 
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor 
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed 
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association. 
(2) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms of current committee 
members expire, the governor shall appoint each new member or reap-
pointed member to a four-year term. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (a), the governor 
shall, at the time of appointment or reappointment, .adjust the length of 
terms to ensure that the terms of committee members are staggered so 
that approximately half of the committee is appointed every two years. 
(3) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replace-
ment shall be appointed for the unexpired term. 
RECEIVED
 JUL 3 0 1996 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300048 DA 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 7-26-96 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996 AT 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
AS PER RULES 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY AS PER RULES 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
AS PER RULES 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
AUGUST 26, 1996 AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9:00 A.M. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PREPARE AN 
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT. 
DATED THIS 26TH DAY OF JULY, 1996. 
• * 
^ 
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICjffi% 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. %_ % 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300048 DA 
HONORABLE JUDGE W. BOHLING 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 2/6/97 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON JUNE 13, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
JUNE 9, 1997 AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE 
••>WW"Hfffr DATE APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING 
DATED THIS 6TH DAY OF FEBR 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300048 DA 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 6/19/97 APPROXIMATELY 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON AUGUST 14, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
(AS PER RULES) 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY (AS PER RULES) 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
(AS PER RULES) 
7. NO FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
TLED 
11. OTHER MATTERS: MATTER WAS PRE-TRIED ON 6/9/97; NOT SET-
: TRIAL DATES OF 6/13/97 & 6/24/97 WERE BUMPED/OTHER TRIALS. 
DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF JULY, 1997. „„„„„„ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REHN, MARY J. 
-VS-
REHN, CHARLES C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
CASE NO. 964300048 DA 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON (SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON AUGUST 14, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
(SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY (SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
(SEE PRIOR NOTICE) 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
AUGUST 11, 1997 AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
11. OTHER MATTERS: (PRE-TRIAL IS SET AT JUDGE BRIAN'S RE-
QUEST) (TRIAL IS SET FOR 1/2 TO 1 DAY) 
DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF JULY, 1997.
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In compliance wah the Americans with Disabilities Act. individuals needing special ''''"''''mm*^ 
accommodations fwduding auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this 
proceedmg should call Third District/Circuit Court (801)3364451 ext 20S. 1S^^Ti^^^^c^ 
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Current Expenses 
Rent - $1050/month - Exhibit A 
Car payment - S575/mo - Exhibit B 
Water - 538/month - Exhibit C 
Sewer- $28/mo - Exhibit D 
Phone - $63/month - Exhibit E 
Gas (Mountain Fuels) -$58/mo - Exhibit F 
Auto Gas/oil/repair - $ 100/mo - Exhibit G 
Car insurance - $ 142/mo - Exhibit H 
Renters insurance - $ 16/mo - Exhibit I 
Life Insurance - $52/mo - Exhibit J 
Medical/Vision/Dental - $214/mo - Exhibit K 
Food - $400/mo - Exhibit L 
Laundry and Dry Cleaning - S50/mo - Exhibit M 
Entertainment (clubs,social obligations,travel,recreation) - $150/mo 
Daycare - $136/mo - Exhibit O 
Legal - $200/mo — deferred 
Motor Vehicle Registration - $20/mo - Exhibit Q 
Maintenance(household) - $50/mo —deferred 
Clothing -$ 100/mo " d e f e r r e d 
Incidentals - $150/mo — deferred 
Electric Bill - $46/mo - Exhibit X 
Subtotal - $3,638 
Current child support - $1055/mo 
Current temporary alimony - $750/mo 
Total monthly expenditures - $5443/mo 
Monthly take home pay - $4838/mo 
Current deficit - $604/mo 
Sheetl 
Mary and Charles Rehn 
Joint Checking Account -1 
Expenses 
Food 
Utilities/phone 
Gas-car 
Car ins. 
Med/dental 
Child care 
Clothes 
Incidentals 
church 
haircuts 
misc. 
school/books 
Total Incidental 
Entertainment 
health club 
misc. ent. 
Total Entertainm 
rent+car 
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January 
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i 
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635 
240 
50 
190 
.'_"!___ 643 
126" 
60 
16 j 1 2 
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282 
107 
31 
138 
1575 
[
 4061 
March 
974 
240 
"7 87 
643 
175 
89 
20 
" 35 
25 
37 
17 _U_7 
103 
246 
349 
1575 
3852 
April 
905 
185 
50 
"280 
380 
160 
181 
42 
52 
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100 
__ 208 
1575 
4164 
May 
_1000 
150 
95 
98 
50 
343 
330 
5 
39 
62 
106 
112 
80 
192 
1575 
^952 
June 
1090 
122 
110 
192 
98 
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95 
20 
J ^70 
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foo 
78 
J78 
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[ 4647 
July 
972 
" 380 
105 
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50 
50 
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1575 
3876 
August 
931 
1 2 7 
96 
20 
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28 
2& 
90 
90 
JZ3371 
3391 
September 
1240 
125 
94 
300 
23 
23 
117 
125 
242 
1575 
3725 
Ave. mo. 
865 
192 
62 
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174 
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20 
19 
25 
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94 
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217 
1575 
3959 
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